Superjet: The Rise and Fall of Russia's Aviation Hope

The first and so far only Russian aircraft designed, assembled, and flown. However, the project«s scope was later reduced, and the Superjets gradually began to disappear from the fleets of airlines, both foreign and domestic.

How did it happen that the Superjet ceased to be the hope of domestic aviation, became a byword, and how did Boeing contribute?

Fontanka looked into these questions.

Single Runway

This aircraft took to the skies thanks to an unexpected competition announced by the then-existing Rosaviakosmos. The agency declared: whoever presents the best civil aircraft project gets the funding for implementation. That was in 2002. Three projects submitted bids:

Tu-414 from Tupolev OJSC;

M-60-70 from Myasishchev Design Bureau (EMZ im. V. M. Myasishcheva);

Russian Regional Jet (RRJ) from Sukhoi Design Bureau (OKB Sukhoi).

In 2003, the winner was announced. Henceforth, Russia would invest in building the Russian Regional Jet, with Sukhoi Design Bureau assembling the machine. The bureau had no prior involvement with civil aviation.

“As part of this project, Russian aircraft design firms actively collaborated with Boeing (USA). As a result of this cooperation, a quite promising development emerged. The project has great export potential in markets of near and far abroad,” said Rosaviakosmos press secretary Sergei Gorbunov, announcing RRJ«s victory.

They planned to build the RRJ-60, RRJ-75, and RRJ-95. The numbers indicate the passenger capacity.

There are many “buts” in this story, both before and after this event.

In 2001, the Russian government stated that replacing old Soviet aircraft with new ones was a priority. And at that time, the country essentially had a ready solution: the short-haul Tu-334 and the regional Tu-324. The first “Tupolev” was almost completely ready, with plans to put it into service in 2003. The second – the 324 – was supposed to start carrying passengers in 2005. This was how the country intended to replace the aging Tu-134s.

Moreover, in 2002, the government planned to fund not the Russian Regional Jet. There was no talk of it. That year, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov* signed a directive “On the completion of creation and start of serial production of the Tu-334 aircraft.”

The document states that the government accepted Rosaviakosmos«s proposal to begin serial production of the Tu-334 in 2004. The aircraft was to be certified in 2003. For this, the directive said, Rosaviakosmos must “ensure priority financing of work” on this aircraft.

Despite this directive and the priority of the Tupolevs, Rosaviakosmos unexpectedly announces a competition, awards victory to, roughly speaking, a “zero” project, and directs all financial flows into the Russian Regional Jet. The Tu-334 and Tu-324, in full combat readiness, remain in the hangars. The projects are closed.

“At that time, the head of this project, Mikhail Pogosyan, said that 85% of the aircraft would be sold to Western countries, and 15% used for domestic flights. They believed him. Announcing such things without even having an aircraft is provocation. A provocation to get additional billions from the budget, which he succeeded in doing for a long time,” comments Honored Pilot Oleg Smirnov, Chairman of the Civil Aviation Commission of the Public Council of Rostransnadzor, and Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation of the USSR from 1983–1990.

Oleg Mikhailovich Smirnov

Honored Pilot, Chairman of the Civil Aviation Commission of the Public Council of Rostransnadzor, Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation of the USSR from 1983–1990. Graduated from the Siberian Military Aviation School for Pilots in 1960. And in 1972 from the Order of Lenin Civil Aviation Academy. From 1960 for 14 years he served as aircraft commander, flight commander, squadron commander, flight detachment commander, first deputy commander of the Karaganda Aviation Enterprise of the Kazakh Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation. The next three years as first deputy head of the Latvian Civil Aviation Directorate in Riga. From 1977 to 1983 as head of the Estonian Civil Aviation Directorate in Tallinn. For the following seven years as Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation of the USSR. Later worked in Finland, then in Moscow.

Mastered more than ten types of aircraft, including the Yak-40, MiG-15, MiG-18, An-2, Li-2, An-24, Il-18, Tu-134, Tu-154, and others. Accident-free flight time: about 15,000 hours (about half of which were night flights). Total flight experience: 40 years.

The situation looks even more contradictory when recalling that on June 26, 2002, a presentation of the Tu-334 took place at St. Petersburg airport. At that time, Alexander Neradko, then First Deputy Minister of Transport of Russia, said: this aircraft should become one of the most in demand in the CIS. The then-existing airline Pulkovo even announced plans to buy 15–20 Tupolevs. But, as we know, neither the airline nor the Tu would exist a couple of years later.

And while authorities at all levels were betting on the Tupolevs, another story was developing in parallel. Boeing President Phil Condit arrives in Moscow. It was 2001. The head of the American corporation signs an agreement on long-term cooperation with Rosaviakosmos head Yuri Koptev. The main point: joint development of a regional aircraft. The name of the new domestic airliner was coined by Phil Condit himself – henceforth it is the Russian Regional Jet. Serial production was expected to begin in 2006.

Even before winning the competition, the not-yet-existent domestic aircraft led a busy life: Aeroflot announced its desire to buy at least 30 aircraft, French Snecma together with Russian engineers undertook to assemble the SM146 engines (later SaM146), another agreement was signed with Boeing, under which the Americans were to assist with development, design, program management, supplier work, production, after-sales support, and even marketing.

Incidentally, the head of Rosaviakosmos at the time, Koptev, was also chairman of the board of directors at Sukhoi Design Bureau.

But the Russian Regional Jet did not last long. In the summer of 2006, at the Farnborough-2006 airshow, Mikhail Pogosyan, head of Sukhoi and the chief ideologue of the project, announced: now RRJ is the Sukhoi SuperJet-100.

“The time has come to give this aircraft a new name that is understandable to the market,” said Pogosyan.

At the same time, deadlines were announced: the first flight of the new aircraft was scheduled for November 2006, start of operation – end of 2007 or beginning of 2008. At Sukhoi, they stated that “according to the most modest plans” they would assemble at least 700 new SSJ-100s.

In reality, Boeing left the project, and against this backdrop the project was renamed. Although back in 2005, the company planned to invest $2.5–3 billion in the Russian aviation industry by 2010. Those figures were announced by Mike Cave, senior vice president of the American corporation. He also said Boeing views Russia as its long-term strategic partner. And no wonder: from 1991 to 2001, the company invested $1.3 billion in the Russian aviation industry, and from 2001 to 2005 another $1 billion.

“We believe in your strategy, we believe that the Russian aviation industry is capable of creating and selling new aircraft. Closer cooperation with Boeing will allow preserving the industry«s intellectual potential and ensuring its financial stability during the transition period. We are ready to be the number one investor,” said Cave.

It didn«t work out.

Takeoff Runway

Regardless, the SSJ-100 was lifted into the sky. After some delays, on May 19, 2008, the Sukhoi Superjet made its first flight – a test flight. The SSJ gradually passed all flight tests, and in parallel, Russia concluded cooperation agreements on aircraft manufacturing with Italy and Hungary, and remained closely tied with France.

While the aviation world was focused on Sukhoi«s breakthrough, the Accounts Chamber of Russia in 2007 quietly published a report on its website. It again brings us back to the Rosaviakosmos competition. The three contenders were reviewed by an expert council for scientific and technical support of the federal program “Development of Russian Civil Aviation Technology for 2002–2010 and for the Period up to 2015.” In their reports, experts noted the following:

In terms of technical and economic characteristics such as fuel efficiency and transportation cost, the Tu-414 aircraft is preferable to the RRJ-75;

Aircraft of the RRJ family carry an increased risk from the standpoint of ensuring reliable operation.

Despite this, the experts decided to select the RRJ. Their reasoning: this aircraft would have more extra-budgetary funding, better chances of passing international certification, and a higher likelihood of being exported.

The same document contains a completely transparent answer to why the Tu-334 project was shut down.

“The program rejects the Tu-334 aircraft not based on market analysis, study of demand and supply, but because it is «competitive with the RRJ project».”

Moreover, the Accounts Chamber concluded at the time that this could at the very least be a violation of the law “On Protection of Competition.” Potentially responsible parties were also named: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Energy, and the Federal Agency for Industry. This despite the fact that, as stated in the report, “the capacity of domestic and foreign markets allows organizing serial production of these aircraft simultaneously.”

But all this data remained on dusty shelves in the archives of the Accounts Chamber.

Meanwhile, certification and delivery of the SSJ to airlines dragged on. It was 2009, and the Superjet should have been carrying passengers in several countries for a couple of years already. But there were still only talks, promises, and shifting deadlines.

Meanwhile, airlines began to lose patience: Dalavia, which had signed a contract for aircraft delivery, filed a lawsuit. The company demanded the return of 50 million rubles (approximately $556,000 at current rates) it had paid as an advance in 2006. The first two aircraft were to be delivered to Dalavia in 2008. Against the backdrop of the financial crisis, the airline ceased to exist in 2009.

Then came the long-awaited day – February 3, 2011: the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) issued a type certificate for the Sukhoi Superjet-100. That same month, SSJ ideologue Mikhail Pogosyan became president of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC).

The first aircraft, named “Yuri Gagarin,” was delivered almost three months later to the Armenian airline Armavia. The first flight was on April 21. The aircraft landed in Sheremetyevo with over 90 passengers on board. Armavia planned to fly the SSJ to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sochi, and Ukrainian cities. But already in 2012, the airline officially refused the Russian aircraft.

“We consider it inexpedient to take the aircraft, as during the year of operation the airliner required repairs,” said a press service representative at the time.

Armavia owner Mikhail Baghdasarov even stated that the company was rejecting the Sukhoi Superjet-100 because it did not meet the declared GOST standards. A year later, in 2013, due to the financial crisis, Armavia ceased to exist.

In the summer of 2011, Aeroflot received its first Superjet. By that time, the airline had accumulated enough complaints against GSS (Sukhoi Civil Aircraft) due to delivery delays – there were even court cases. But with the receipt of the first aircraft, a new problem emerged – far more serious. Aeroflot could not fly the SSJ due to technical malfunctions. Experts at the time said these were “false alarms of sensors” that, in their opinion, did not affect operations. But the airline demanded an inspection.

A little later, Aeroflot CEO Vitaly Savelyev would express himself as follows:

“We are not abandoning our orders; the only thing is, we have written everywhere, in preliminary contracts and in the contract we will sign, that our equipment will meet all world standards. If not, we will not take it.”

Black Streak

Early in the morning of May 9, 2012, an SSJ-100 made its first demonstration flight in Indonesia and landed successfully. Four crew members and 41 passengers were ready for the second flight. On board were Indonesians, Russians, a Frenchman, and an American. The pilot started the engines and lifted the Superjet from Halim Airport. He contacted the controller several times, requesting clearance for maneuvers.

Almost 20 minutes later, the SSJ disappeared from radar. Communication was lost. According to official reports from the National Transportation Safety Committee, the cockpit sounded the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) signal. The crew, believing it was a false alarm, turned off the system. As the investigation later showed, the pilot did not account for the terrain, and the aircraft flew into the slope of Mount Salak. All 45 people on board died. The cause of the crash was attributed to pilot error.

“The fate of this passenger plane – the first new model produced in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union – was a crushing blow to a national aerospace industry hungry for revival,” wrote The New York Times about the disaster.

Meanwhile, complaints about the SSJ in Russia were mounting. Aeroflot canceled flights due to the technical condition of the aircraft. What happened:

door open alarm activated;

air leak sensor activated;

partial cabin depressurization;

temperature sensor failure in the air conditioning system;

problems with the landing gear.

These are just some of the incidents that occurred over the 1 year of aircraft operation. In early 2013, Aeroflot had enough and erupted in criticism of the Superjets. At a presentation on “Aeroflot Flight Safety in 2012,” the company stated: ten aircraft of this type accounted for 40% of all incidents related to aviation equipment failures. The most serious were related to the reliability of the landing gear control system.

GSS official representative Andrei Muravyov then commented: Aeroflot simply had too high requirements.

“The fact is that Aeroflot imposed increased requirements on the SSJ, given that it is a new project. There were problems, but through joint efforts with airline representatives, they were resolved, in particular, a technical bulletin with recommendations for maintenance and operation of the Superjets was introduced. We expect that soon 99% of our airliners will be used by Aeroflot,” he said.

A year after the Indonesia disaster, another serious incident occurred with a different aircraft. In June 2013, a Sukhoi Superjet-100 flying from Moscow to Odessa experienced an engine failure. The airliner managed to land safely, with no casualties. But the trouble was that this particular Aeroflot aircraft was new – the company had received it just over a week earlier.

“Aeroflot was forced to take these aircraft. But soon it refused them and transferred them to Rossiya. Because as soon as a component fails, the aircraft is parked. And considering that 80% of components were Western, they had to order the failed part and wait for it to arrive. Meanwhile, the aircraft sits for a month. A grounded aircraft is a financial noose around the airline«s neck. Not only does this expensive thing not generate any revenue, it incurs costs even when just standing,” explains Smirnov.

In October 2018, an aircraft from the airline Yakutia, flying from Ulan-Ude, landed in Yakutsk. After rolling down the runway, the aircraft veered off it. The SSJ«s main landing gear struts collapsed and punctured the fuel tank. Kerosene leaked out. Meanwhile, there were 92 people on board. All survived; several passengers later went to the hospital with bruises.

After the investigation, the Interstate Aviation Committee concluded that the cause was incorrect data about runway icing provided to the crew by airfield services. In simple terms, the aircraft did not have enough traction with the runway.

“This led to a significant increase in landing distance, the aircraft veering off the runway, and colliding with the joint of a reconstructed section of the runway about 0.4 m [1.3 ft] high, which led to the destruction of the main landing gear struts and damage to power elements of the airframe, with fuel leakage but no fire,” the IAC report states.

In the same report, the committee emphasizes: according to regulations, the main landing gear struts must be designed so that their destruction does not cause a leak from the fuel system. Furthermore, the commission concluded that although the SSJ passed certification according to established requirements, “if the aircraft is placed outside the expected operating conditions defined during certification, the risk of fuel tank destruction with fuel leakage remains quite high.”

Based on this, the IAC recommended that the aircraft developer consider design changes to the landing gear to reduce the risk of fuel leakage under “loads exceeding design values.”

Less than a month later, Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matviyenko could not hold back. In November 2018, during a meeting with Transport Minister Yevgeny Ditrikh, she spoke quite harshly about the SSJ.

“We are a great aviation country. Can«t we develop a regional aircraft? This Sukhoi Superjet-100 was made. Well, who needs it? It»s not suitable for regional transportation, it«s not suitable for anything. Aeroflot says: »We bought it – it«s sitting at the gate.» No one abroad is buying it. The aircraft is actually 80%, if not more, foreign. And what have we achieved? How much money has been poured in? Where is the efficiency, where are the aircraft?” said Matviyenko.

The complaints remained hanging in the air; no one changed the aircraft«s design per the IAC recommendation. Six months later, on May 5, 2019, an Aeroflot SSJ departed from Moscow to Murmansk. Six minutes later, the aircraft was struck by lightning. The co-pilot reported to the controller via emergency radio: “Moscow-Approach, requesting return 14-92, loss of radio communication and aircraft in DIRECT MODE.”

Twenty-eight minutes after takeoff, the pilots of the SSJ touched the runway “practically on three points.” And immediately the aircraft lifted off again, then touched down again 2 seconds later, then bounced up again. The third landing was final. This phenomenon is called “porpoising.”

Due to the hard landing, a familiar scenario occurred: the landing gear struts collapsed, punctured the fuel tank, and kerosene began to spill onto the ground. Fire. All services began emergency evacuation of passengers. But not everyone could be saved: that day in Sheremetyevo, 41 people died. Of them, 40 burned.

In the IAC report after the disaster, it again writes about a problem in the aircraft«s design.

“It must be shown that at the moment of landing gear separation, no destruction of the fuel tank occurs at or near the landing gear attachment points. Evaluation of secondary impact from ground contact after gear separation is not required. If the separated gear during subsequent movement can puncture the adjacent fuel tank, then design measures should be taken to minimize the risk of fuel leakage,” the commission«s investigation materials state.

And again it recommends that the developer examine the landing gear and fuel tanks. The IAC also advises aviation authorities to consider revising aircraft certification and possibly expanding requirements.

Officials who had remained silent for years (except for Matviyenko) suddenly began to speak. Some commented on the aircraft«s technical problems, others demanded inspections, while others suddenly became concerned about the high cost of the SSJ. But the sharpest disputes were between Aeroflot and the aircraft»s developers. It got to the point where UAC advisor Boris Alyoshin accused the airline of discrediting the Sukhoi Superjet-100.

“There should not be a one-sided discussion – when a disaster happened, and suddenly Aeroflot told the whole world that the aircraft is trash and crap, to put it in Russian, and that everything is the aircraft«s fault,” said Alyoshin at the Eurasian Aerospace Congress.

Rostec CEO Sergei Chemezov, in turn, responding to airline complaints about the aircraft, said that the SSJ has “teething troubles that are being addressed and will pass over time.” Officials and aviation experts continued to repeat this in various years.

“Teething troubles that have been going on for 15 years are an excuse. The sole purpose is to continue receiving budget money. Billions are still being poured into this project. And since incompetent people sit at the top, they believe it«s »teething troubles.« Although what »teething troubles« – even a fool can see these are design flaws,” says Smirnov.

History repeated itself. On November 24, 2024, a Sukhoi Superjet-100 operated by Azimuth Airlines departed from Moscow for Antalya, Turkey. There were 95 people on board. A hard landing. Fire. This time, everyone was evacuated from the aircraft. The investigation is still ongoing; there are no reports yet. But the cause was announced by Azimuth itself.

“Fuel ignited due to deformation of the fuel tank, which spilled onto the concrete where the fire occurred,” said the airline«s executive director, Eduard Teplitsky.

After this incident, Rosaviatsiya assured that the cause was unlikely to be in the aircraft«s design and there were no grounds to discontinue operation of the SSJ-100.

“No aircraft type – neither Boeing, nor Airbus, nor any of our Soviet Tupolevs, Yakovlevs, or Ilyushins – had such a design where the landing gear struts punctured the fuel tank. Why? Because as long as aviation exists, hard landings will exist. They do not always depend on the pilot. There are external factors: wind shear, thunderstorms, turbulence – a host of factors,” says Smirnov.

Precisely because hard landings cannot be eliminated from aviation, the danger of landing must be minimized by those who design the aircraft. The landing gear is designed for a certain load; they can break – and that is normal. But fuel should not leak.

“Yes, there were hard landings and gear broke. But the struts did not puncture the tank. The aircraft slid on its belly, so to speak, on the concrete – and that was it. But with the Superjet, it«s a systematic issue. A critical design flaw,” says the Honored Pilot.

With such a design, porpoising can have serious consequences, as history has shown. Although porpoising itself is not exclusive to the SSJ-100. All aircraft experience porpoising. Given the peculiarities of the Superjets, Rosaviatsiya urged commanders to pay attention to the softness of landings.

“The aircraft continue to fly with this defect. The aircraft commanders are experienced guys; they already know how to act, what to do. And generally, such cases are becoming fewer and fewer,” added Smirnov.

Landing Runway

In the early 2000s, the Sukhoi Superjet-100 – then still the RRJ – won the competition because the authorities believed foreign airlines would buy this aircraft. And there was indeed demand. Indonesia, Thailand, Egypt, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Armenia, India, Iran, China, Ireland, Belgium, Italy. All these countries planned to purchase Sukhois. Especially since in 2012, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a type certificate.

Mexican carrier Interjet announced the purchase of 30 Sukhoi SuperJet-100s in 2012. The company considered various options but settled on the Russian airliner – the price was lower than competitors. At the time, Russian Ambassador to Mexico Valery Morozov called it a “breakthrough.” Interjet presented the deal as an important strategic step in the airline«s development. But by January 2018, the fleet began to be grounded. In 2019, a significant portion of the Russian aircraft were sent to storage. In 2023, a court declared Interjet bankrupt.

In Latin America, Interjet was once called one of Mexico«s leading airlines. And one of the reasons for its bankruptcy was the purchase of the SSJ-100:

“Starting in 2019, Interjet faced serious financial problems. A series of unfortunate decisions, including the acquisition of Russian Sukhoi SuperJet-100 aircraft, which had operational failures and maintenance issues, negatively affected its financial position. The situation was compounded by debts to suppliers, Mexico«s tax service (SAT), and Mexico City International Airport (AICM), as well as unpaid employee salaries,” writes Ambito, one of Argentina»s most influential daily online publications.

Irish airline CityJet also bet on the Superjet. It purchased them in 2016–2017. But just a couple of years later, the only European operator of the Russian aircraft abandoned them. As reported by the local newspaper The Irish Times, the airline encountered “initial teething problems.” Specifically, maintenance on the SSJ-100 was slow, which “affected their reliability.” CityJet switched to Bombardier CRJ900s. And the Superjets were returned to Russia.

The first Sukhoi was received by Indonesian airline Sky Aviation in 2012, the third in 2014. It planned to buy a total of 12 aircraft. But in that same 2014, the airline announced a suspension of operations due to, as reported by local outlet Tribunnews, financial problems.

And the Superjets could never be sold to Iran. The aircraft consisted of more than 10% American components. This required Russia to obtain US consent to deliver the aircraft. And the States turned out to be against selling the SSJ-100 to Iran. Although plans were grandiose – 100 aircraft over 5 years.

“At that time, I often held working meetings with foreigners, talked on the phone, and I asked: «Why aren»t you taking the Superjet?« They answered: »Well, if a participant in this project refused, and they know more about it than we do, then we won«t buy it either,»” says the Honored Pilot.

In his opinion, one of the reasons is the lack of after-sales service. For instance, Boeing and Airbus specify in their deal documents that they guarantee delivery of any spare parts and failed mechanisms anywhere in the world within 24 hours.

“Pogosyan, having spent many, many billions, did not organize after-sales technical service for this aircraft. That«s where they burned. Of course, no company will buy aircraft without such a guarantee. To this day, Western companies are absolutely cool towards this aircraft. And they increasingly understand that they did the right thing,” believes Smirnov.

According to Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Gennady Abramenkov, said in July 2026, there are currently 150 aircraft “on the wing” at Russian airlines. The main operator in the country – Rossiya Airlines – has 78 aircraft. Sukhois are also present in varying numbers at Red Wings, Azimuth, Yamal, IrAero, and Yakutia.

Incidentally, in 2024, after the incident in Turkey, Rostransnadzor and Rosaviatsiya conducted an inspection of Azimuth. And they found more than 20 violations in flight safety. For example, Azimuth concealed SSJ-100 landings with excessive load, underestimated crew shift durations, and allowed aircraft to fly without proper maintenance. Moreover, about 12% of all airliner landings in 2024 were carried out with the porpoising that is familiar and dangerous when performed on the Superjet.

On its website, Azimuth states that its fleet consists solely of SSJ-100s.

Go-Around

The Superjet received a new name. For the third time. This happened in 2023. Since then, the Sukhoi Superjet-100 has simply become the Superjet-100 (SJ-100).

This time, the reason was import substitution. The SJ-100 is a fully domestic version of the Sukhoi. But there is a possibility that this aircraft will change its name a fourth time. In 2024, Sergei Chemezov said that the Superjet could become the “Yakovlev.”

Initially, the Sukhoi consisted of nearly 80% foreign components. But after 2022, there were no options left – they had to come up with their own. And the main thing that domestic engineers did was a new engine. Development of the PD-8 began long before the sanctions – in 2019. But, as usual, development, production, and certification dragged on.

In June 2023, then-Minister of Industry and Trade of the Russian Federation Denis Manturov reported: certification of the PD-8 aircraft engine was planned for the end of the year. In July 2025, Rostec reported that serial production of the engine would begin in 2025. The corporation also added: in 2026, they are ready to make 30 such engines. And this, as can be seen, did not happen.

The fully domestic engine received certification in early June 2026. At the end of the same month, it was launched into serial production.

The story with the Superjet«s engines is generally interesting. All aircraft still have SaM146 engines, but since 2022, the French have refused to make engines for the Russian airliner. The PD-8 was still at the “coming soon” stage. There was nothing left to do but extend the service life of the SaM146 so that the aircraft could continue flying. That»s exactly what Rosaviatsiya did in 2025. At the same time, they reported: the Sukhois with Franco-Russian engines will be able to fly until 2028–2029.

And then what? Then re-engining. Or, as Oleg Smirnov says, “billions down the drain.” The old Sukhois will have their foreign engines removed and replaced with domestic ones. But this process is not simple. As our interlocutor says, it is necessary to redesign the nacelle, attachment points, and generally alter the structure. This, in turn, will lead to airlines simply not being able to financially afford such an aircraft.

“The aircraft was «golden»; it will become «diamond.» No company in our country will be able to afford such an expensive one. Because re-engining an aircraft of this type costs more than the residual value of the aircraft itself. And since many aircraft have already largely exhausted their service life, there is generally no point in installing these engines. This is clearly a loss-making product for airlines,” explains Smirnov.

According to him, there is a possibility that after the engine replacement, the aircraft will be parked. Along with the new engines. The service life is exhausted – they won«t be flown.

“Re-engining is a very expensive pleasure. And to put new engines on the Superjets for that kind of money? It«s just billions down the drain,” added the interlocutor.

According to preliminary estimates, which Kommersant reported citing sources in early July, re-engining will cost at least 115 billion rubles (approximately $1.28 billion at current rates). That is the cost of changing engines on 50 aircraft. So it turns out that two engines will cost 2.3 billion rubles ($25.6 million). Considering that the price of the entire aircraft is 3.7 billion rubles ($41.1 million).

Head of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) Vadim Badekha, in turn, hastened to state that the engine replacement would be paid for by the airlines themselves.

“The cost of this modification is not high, nor is it something the airline«s economy cannot withstand. We do not plan to attract federal funds to finance the re-engining procedure itself,” he said, adding that, according to UAC estimates, 50–100 Superjets will undergo re-engining.

In total, during import substitution, Rostec said, “about 40 imported systems and assemblies” were replaced in the Sukhois. What is now “our own” in the aircraft:

SaM146 engines replaced with Russian PD-8s;

Avionics: fully replaced the flight and navigation complex;

Landing gear;

Auxiliary power unit (APU) replaced with a Russian analogue;

Control systems, including the fly-by-wire system;

Electrical power supply, air conditioning, and fire protection systems;

Passenger cabin interior;

Simplified fuselage.

And considering that the aircraft has been redesigned by almost 80%, it is already a different Superjet. And it must pass certification again. In fact, it was sent for testing in June 2024. Still being tested; no type certificate yet.

Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a directive. According to the documents, the timelines for putting all domestic aircraft into operation are shifting to the right. The first two SJ-100s were originally to be delivered to the customer in December 2023. Now the deadline is July–August 2026.

“Building an aircraft means thousands of components. And where are they? Essentially, aircraft manufacturers are starting many things from scratch now. They need factories, they need machine tools that existed before, but all production was destroyed. There«s no need to say they»ll make 20 aircraft in a year. You need to look around and see whether industry is capable of this,” explains Smirnov on the delays in production timelines.

According to him, even if domestic aircraft manufacturers fulfill a quarter of the set plans, that would already be good.

“We must give credit to our engineers, designers, and scientists: somehow, we have taken the first steps in import substitution,” he added.

Intersecting Runways

In theory, this should not have happened. But, as they say, anything can happen. The idea was to build two new aircraft for different needs: the regional SJ-100 for short and medium routes, and the mainline MS-21 for long routes.

Only the MS-21, during active import substitution, lost its range: it decreased from 6,350 km (3,946 mi) to 3,830 km (2,380 mi). The range of the SJ-100 is 3,530 km (2,193 mi), states the developer. The MS-21 can carry a maximum of 211 passengers, while the SJ-100 can carry 103 passengers. The cruising speed is the same for both aircraft: Mach 0.82, which is approximately 870–890 km/h (541–553 mph). If we add another aircraft that domestic engineers are working to revive – the Tu-214 – solving the equation will not be easy. The Tupolev«s range is 3,800 km (2,361 mi). Maximum capacity: 210 passengers.

The question: who is the odd one out here?

* Mikhail Kasyanov was designated a foreign agent in Russia in 2023. In 2025, Rosfinmonitoring included him in the list of terrorists and extremists.