SJ-100: How the Superjet Lost Its Way

The first and so far only Russian aircraft that was designed, assembled and put into the sky. However, the project was later scaled down, and Superjets gradually began to disappear from airline fleets — both foreign and domestic.

How did it happen that the Superjet ceased to be the hope of Russian aviation, became a byword, and how did Boeing have a hand in the aircraft?

Fontanka looked into these issues.

Solo Runway

This aircraft took to the skies thanks to an unexpected competition held by the then-existing Rosaviakosmos (Russian Aviation and Space Agency). The agency announced: whoever presents the best civil aircraft project gets the money for implementation. That was in 2002. Three projects were submitted:

Tu-414 from Tupolev OJSC;

M-60-70 from the Myasishchev Experimental Machine-Building Plant (EMZ);

Russian Regional Jet (RRJ) from the Sukhoi Design Bureau.

In 2003, the winner was announced. From then on, Russia would invest in building the Russian Regional Jet, and Sukhoi Design Bureau would assemble the aircraft. The bureau had no prior involvement with civil aviation.

«Within this project, Russian aircraft design firms actively collaborated with Boeing (USA). As a result of this cooperation, a fairly promising development emerged. The project has great export potential in markets near and far abroad,» said Rosaviakosmos spokesman Sergei Gorbunov, announcing the RRJ victory.

Plans were made for RRJ-60, RRJ-75, and RRJ-95. The numbers indicated the passenger capacity of each airliner.

There are many «buts» in this story both before and after this event.

In 2001, the Russian government declared that replacing old Soviet aircraft with new ones was a priority. And by that time, the country essentially had a ready-made solution — the short-haul Tu-334 and the regional Tu-324. The first «Tupolev» was almost completely ready, and was planned to enter service in 2003. The second — the Tu-324 — was supposed to start carrying passengers in 2005. This was how the country wanted to replace the aging Tu-134.

Moreover, in 2002, the government planned to fund not the Russian Regional Jet. There was no talk of it. That year, Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov* signed a directive «On Completing the Creation and Starting Serial Production of the Tu-334 Aircraft».

The document states that the government accepts the proposal of Rosaviakosmos to begin serial production of the Tu-334 in 2004. The airliner was to be certified in 2003. To achieve this, the directive says, Rosaviakosmos must «ensure priority funding of work» on this aircraft.

Despite this directive and the priority status of the «Tupolevs», Rosaviakosmos unexpectedly announces a competition, awards victory to what is essentially a «zero» project, and directs all financial flows to the Russian Regional Jet. The Tu-334 and Tu-324 remain in hangars in full combat readiness. The projects are shut down.

«At that time, project leader Mikhail Pogosyan said that 85% of the aircraft would be sold to Western countries, and 15% would be used for domestic transportation. He was believed. Announcing such things without even having the aircraft is provocation. Provocation to obtain additional billions from the budget, which he managed to do for a long time,» comments Honored Pilot Oleg Smirnov, Chairman of the Civil Aviation Commission of the Public Council of Rostransnadzor, and Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation of the USSR from 1983 to 1990.

Oleg Mikhailovich Smirnov

Honored Pilot, Chairman of the Civil Aviation Commission of the Public Council of Rostransnadzor, Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation of the USSR from 1983 to 1990. Graduated from the Siberian Military Aviation School for Pilots in 1960. In 1972, from the Order of Lenin Academy of Civil Aviation. From 1960, for 14 years, he served as aircraft commander, flight commander, squadron commander, flight detachment commander, and first deputy commander of the Karaganda Aviation Enterprise of the Kazakh Administration of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation. The next three years — first deputy head of the Latvian Civil Aviation Administration in Riga. From 1977 to 1983 — head of the Estonian Civil Aviation Administration in Tallinn. For the following seven years — Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation of the USSR. Later worked in Finland, then in Moscow.

Mastered more than ten types of aircraft, including the Yak-40, MiG-15, MiG-18, An-2, Li-2, An-24, Il-18, Tu-134, Tu-154, and others. Accident-free flight time — about 15,000 hours (of which nearly half were night flights). Total flight experience — 40 years.

The situation appears even more contradictory when recalling that on June 26, 2002, a presentation of the Tu-334 took place at St. Petersburg airport. At that time, Alexander Neradko, then First Deputy Minister of Transport of Russia, said: this aircraft should become one of the most in demand in the CIS. The then-existing airline Pulkovo even announced plans to buy 15–20 «Tupolevs». But as is known, neither the airline nor the Tu would exist a couple of years later.

And while the country«s authorities at all levels were betting on the »Tupolevs«, another story was developing in parallel. Boeing President Phil Condit arrives in Moscow. It was 2001. The head of the American corporation signs an agreement on long-term cooperation with the head of Rosaviakosmos, Yuri Koptev. The main point — joint development of a regional aircraft. The name of the new domestic airliner is coined by Phil Condit himself — from now on, it is the Russian Regional Jet. It was assumed that serial production would begin in 2006.

Even before winning the competition, the yet non-existent domestic aircraft had a bustling life: Aeroflot announced its desire to buy at least 30 aircraft, French Snecma together with Russian engineers undertook to build SM146 engines (later SaM146), another agreement was signed with Boeing for American assistance with development, design, program management, supplier relations, production, aftermarket support, and even marketing.

Incidentally, the then head of Rosaviakosmos, Koptev, was also chairman of the board of directors at Sukhoi Design Bureau.

But the Russian Regional Jet did not last long. In the summer of 2006, at the Farnborough Airshow, Mikhail Pogosyan, head of Sukhoi and the main ideologue of the project, announced: now the RRJ is the Sukhoi SuperJet-100.

«The time has come to give this aircraft a new name that is understandable to the market,» said Pogosyan.

At the same time, deadlines were announced: the first flight of the new aircraft was scheduled for November 2006, the start of operation — late 2007 or early 2008. Sukhoi said that «by the most modest estimates» they would build at least 700 new SSJ-100s.

In reality, Boeing withdrew from the project, and against this backdrop the project was renamed. Yet as early as 2005, the company planned to invest $2.5–3 billion in the Russian aviation industry by 2010. Those figures were voiced by the American corporation«s senior vice president, Mike Cave. He also said that Boeing views Russia as its long-term strategic partner. And understandably so: from 1991 to 2001, the company invested $1.3 billion in the Russian aviation industry, and from 2001 to 2005, another $1 billion.

«We believe in your strategy, we believe that the Russian aviation industry is capable of creating and selling new aircraft. Closer cooperation with Boeing will allow preserving the intellectual potential of the industry and ensuring its financial stability during the transition period. We are ready to be the number one investor,» said Cave.

It didn«t work out.

Runway

Be that as it may, the SSJ-100 takes to the sky. With slight delays, on May 19, 2008, the Sukhoi Superjet makes its first flight — a test flight. The SSJ gradually passes all flight tests, and simultaneously Russia signs agreements on aircraft manufacturing cooperation with Italy and Hungary, and remains closely tied with France.

And while the aviation world is focused on Sukhoi«s breakthrough, the Russian Accounts Chamber in 2007 quietly published a report on its website. It brings us back to the Rosaviakosmos competition. The three candidates were evaluated by an expert council on scientific and technical support for the federal program »Development of Civil Aviation Technology in Russia for 2002–2010 and up to 2015«. In their reports, the specialists noted the following:

In terms of technical and economic characteristics such as fuel efficiency and cost per seat, the Tu-414 aircraft is preferable to the RRJ-75;

The RRJ family aircraft have an increased risk regarding reliable operation.

Despite this, the experts chose the RRJ. Their rationale: this aircraft will have more extra-budgetary funding, a better chance of obtaining international certification, and a higher likelihood of export.

The same document provides a perfectly transparent answer to why the Tu-334 project was shut down.

«The program rejects the Tu-334 aircraft not based on market analysis, demand and supply studies, but because it is competitive with the RRJ project.»

Moreover, the Accounts Chamber at that time concluded that this could at least be a violation of the Law on Protection of Competition. Potentially responsible parties were also named: the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Industry and Energy, and the Federal Agency for Industry. This despite the fact that, as stated in the report, «the capacity of domestic and foreign markets allows serial production of these aircraft simultaneously».

But all this data remained gathering dust on the shelves of the Accounts Chamber archives.

Meanwhile, certification and delivery of the SSJ to airlines dragged on. It was 2009, and the Superjet should have been carrying passengers in several countries for a couple of years. But only talk, promises, and schedule shifts continued.

Meanwhile, airlines began to lose patience: Dalavia, which had signed a contract for aircraft delivery, filed a lawsuit. The company demanded the return of 50 million rubles (approximately $500,000 at current rates) it had paid as an advance in 2006. Dalavia was supposed to receive its first two aircraft in 2008. Due to the financial crisis, the airline ceased to exist in 2009.

The day that had been awaited for several years arrives: on February 3, 2011, the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) issues a type certificate for the Sukhoi Superjet-100. That same month, SSJ ideologist Mikhail Pogosyan becomes president of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC).

The first aircraft, named «Yuri Gagarin», is received nearly three months later by the Armenian airline Armavia. The first flight takes place on April 21. The aircraft lands at Sheremetyevo, with more than 90 passengers on board. Armavia planned to fly the SSJ to Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sochi, and Ukrainian cities. But already in 2012, the airline officially refused the Russian aircraft.

«We consider it inexpedient to take the aircraft, as during the year of operation the airliner required repairs,» said a press service representative at the time.

The owner of Armavia, Mikhail Baghdasarov, even stated that the company was rejecting the Sukhoi Superjet-100 due to its non-compliance with the stated GOST standard. A year later, in 2013, due to the financial crisis, Armavia ceased to exist.

In the summer of 2011, Aeroflot receives its first Superjet. By that time, the airline had accumulated enough complaints against Sukhoi Civil Aircraft (SCA) over delayed deliveries — there were even lawsuits. But with the arrival of the first aircraft, a new problem emerged — much more serious. Aeroflot could not fly the SSJ due to technical malfunctions. Experts at the time said these were «false sensor readings» that, in their opinion, did not affect operations. But the airline demanded an inspection.

A little later, Aeroflot CEO Vitaly Savelyev would express himself as follows:

«We are not abandoning our orders; the only thing is, we have written everywhere, in the preliminary contracts and in the contract we will sign, that our equipment must meet all world standards. If not, we will not take it.»

Black Streak

Early in the morning of May 9, 2012, the SSJ-100 made its first demonstration flight in Indonesia and landed successfully. Four crew members and 41 passengers are ready for the second flight. On board are Indonesians, Russians, a Frenchman, and an American. The pilot starts the engines and lifts the Superjet from Halim Airport. He contacts the controller several times, requesting permission for maneuvers.

After nearly 20 minutes, the SSJ disappears from radar. Communication is lost. According to official reports from the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee, the Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alarm sounded in the cockpit. The crew, considering it false, disables the system. As the investigation would later show, the pilot did not account for the terrain and the aircraft flew into the slope of Mount Salak. All 45 people on board died. The cause of the crash was attributed to pilot error.

«The fate of this passenger plane — the first new model produced in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union — proved a crushing blow to a national aerospace industry hungry for revival,» wrote The New York Times about the disaster.

Meanwhile, complaints about the SSJ were growing in Russia. Aeroflot cancels flights due to the technical condition of the aircraft. Incidents included:

door open alarm activation;

air leak sensor activation;

partial cabin depressurization;

failure of the air conditioning temperature sensor;

problems with the landing gear.

These are just some of the cases that occurred over one year of operation. In early 2013, Aeroflot could no longer remain silent and expressed sharp criticism of the Superjets. At a presentation on «Flight Safety of Aeroflot OJSC in 2012», the company stated: ten aircraft of this type accounted for 40% of all incidents related to aviation equipment failures. The most serious were related to the reliability of the landing gear control system.

SCA official representative Andrei Muravyov then commented: Aeroflot simply has too high requirements.

«The fact is that Aeroflot imposed higher requirements on the SSJ given that it is a new project. There were problems, but through joint efforts with the airline»s representatives, they were eliminated, in particular by introducing a technical bulletin with recommendations for the maintenance and operation of the Superjets. We expect that in the near future, 99% of our airliners will be used by Aeroflot,« he said.

A year after the Indonesia disaster, a serious incident occurs with another aircraft. In June 2013, a Sukhoi Superjet-100 flying from Moscow to Odessa experienced an engine failure. The airliner managed to land safely, with no casualties. But the irony: this Aeroflot aircraft was brand new — the company had received it just over a week earlier.

«Aeroflot was forced to take these aircraft. But soon abandoned them and handed them over to Rossiya. Because as soon as any component fails, the aircraft is parked. And considering that 80% of the components were Western, they had to order the failed part and wait for it to arrive. Meanwhile, the aircraft sits for a month. A grounded aircraft is a financial noose around an airline»s neck. Not only does this expensive thing not generate any revenue, it requires expenditure even when just standing still,« explains Smirnov.

In October 2018, a Yakutia Airlines aircraft from Ulan-Ude landed in Yakutsk. After rolling down the runway, the aircraft went off the edge. The SSJ«s main landing gear struts collapsed and punctured the fuel tank. Kerosene leaked out. Meanwhile, 92 people were on board. All survived; several passengers later sought medical treatment for bruises.

After the investigation, the Interstate Aviation Committee (IAC) concluded that the cause was incorrect data about runway icing provided to the crew by the airfield services. In simple terms, the aircraft did not have enough runway friction.

«This led to a significant increase in landing distance, the aircraft running off the runway, and colliding with the junction of a reconstructed section of the runway about 0.4 m high, which led to the destruction of the main landing gear struts and damage to the airframe»s structural elements with fuel leakage without fire,« states the IAC report.

In the same report, the committee emphasizes: according to regulations, the main landing gear struts should be designed so that their failure does not cause a fuel system leak. Furthermore, the commission concluded that although the SSJ was certified to established requirements, when «the aircraft is placed outside the expected operating conditions defined during certification, the risk of fuel tank rupture with fuel leakage remains quite high.»

Based on this, the IAC recommended that the aircraft developer consider modifying the landing gear design to reduce the risk of fuel leakage under «loads exceeding design limits.»

Less than a month later, Federation Council Speaker Valentina Matvienko loses her patience. In November 2018, during a meeting with Transport Minister Yevgeny Ditrikh, she spoke quite harshly about the SSJ.

«We are a great aviation country. Can»t we develop a regional aircraft? They made this Sukhoi Superjet-100. Who needs it? It«s not suitable for regional transportation; it»s not suitable for anything. Aeroflot says: «We bought it — it»s parked.« Nobody abroad is buying it. The aircraft is actually 80%, if not more, foreign. And what have we achieved? How much money has been pumped in? Where is the efficiency, where are the aircraft?» said Matvienko.

The complaints remained hanging in the air; no one changed the aircraft«s design per the IAC recommendation. Six months later, on May 5, 2019, an Aeroflot SSJ departs from Moscow for Murmansk. After six minutes, the aircraft is struck by lightning. The co-pilot reports to the controller via emergency radio: »Moscow Approach, requesting return 14-92, loss of radio communication and aircraft in DIRECT MODE.«

Twenty-eight minutes after takeoff, the SSJ pilots touch down on the runway «practically on three points.» And the aircraft immediately lifts off again, touches down again two seconds later, and is thrown up again. The third landing is final. This phenomenon is called «porpoising.»

Due to the hard landing, a familiar scenario unfolded: the landing gear struts collapsed, punctured the fuel tank, and kerosene began flooding the ground. Fire. All services began emergency evacuation of passengers. But not everyone could be saved: that day at Sheremetyevo, 41 people died. Forty of them were burned.

In the IAC report after the disaster, the problem with the aircraft«s design is again noted.

«It must be shown that at the moment of landing gear separation, no destruction of the fuel tank occurs at or near the landing gear attachment points. Assessment of secondary impact from ground contact after landing gear separation is not required. If the separated landing gear can puncture the adjacent fuel tank during subsequent movement, then design measures should be taken to minimize the risk of fuel leakage,» states the investigation materials.

And again, the committee recommends that the developer examine the landing gear and fuel tanks. The IAC also advises aviation authorities to consider reviewing the aircraft«s certification and possibly expanding the requirements.

Officials, who had remained silent for years (except Matvienko), suddenly began to speak. Some addressed the aircraft«s technical problems, others demanded inspections, and some were suddenly concerned about the SSJ»s high cost. But the sharpest disputes were between Aeroflot and the aircraft«s developers. It got to the point where UAC advisor Boris Alyoshin accused the airline of discrediting the Sukhoi Superjet-100.

«There should not be a one-sided discussion — when a disaster occurs, and suddenly Aeroflot tells the whole world that the aircraft is junk and garbage, in Russian terms, and that the aircraft is to blame for everything,» said Alyoshin at the Eurasian Aerospace Congress.

Rostec head Sergei Chemezov, in turn, responding to the airlines« complaints about the aircraft, said that the SSJ has »childhood illnesses that are being worked out and will go away over time.« Officials and aviation experts continued to say this over the years.

«»Childhood illnesses« that have been going on for 15 years is an excuse. There is one goal — to continue receiving money from the budget. Billions are still being poured into this project. And since incompetent people sit at the top, they believe that these are »childhood illnesses.« Although what »childhood illnesses« — even a fool understands these are design flaws,» says Smirnov.

History repeated itself. On November 24, 2024, an Azimuth Airlines Sukhoi Superjet-100 departed from Moscow for Antalya, Turkey. On board were 95 people. Hard landing. Fire. This time, everyone was evacuated from the aircraft. The investigation is ongoing; no reports are available yet. But the cause was announced by Azimuth itself.

«The fuel ignited due to deformation of the fuel tank, which leaked onto the concrete, where the combustion occurred,» said the airline«s executive director, Eduard Teplitsky.

After this incident, the Federal Air Transport Agency assured that the cause was unlikely to be the aircraft«s design and that there are no grounds to cease operation of the SSJ-100.

«No type of aircraft — neither Boeing, nor Airbus, nor any of our Soviet Tupolevs, Yakovlevs, or Ilyushins — had a design where landing gear struts were attached in such a way that they would puncture the fuel tank. Why? Because as long as aviation exists, hard landings will exist. They do not always depend on the pilot. There are also external factors: wind shear, thunderstorms, turbulence — a multitude of factors,» says Smirnov.

Precisely because hard landings cannot be eliminated from aviation, the danger of landing must be minimized by those who design the aircraft. Landing gear is designed for a certain load; it can break — that is normal. But fuel should not leak.

«Yes, there were hard landings and landing gear broke. But the struts did not puncture the tank. The aircraft slid on its belly on the concrete — and that was it. But with the Superjet, this is systemic. A critical design flaw,» says the Honored Pilot.

With this design, porpoising can have serious consequences, as history has shown. Although porpoising itself is not unique to the SSJ-100 — all aircraft can porpoise. Given the Superjet«s particularity, the Federal Air Transport Agency urged captains to pay attention to landing smoothness.

«The aircraft continue to fly with this defect. The commanders are experienced guys; they already know how to act, what to do. And, in general, such cases are becoming fewer and fewer,» added Smirnov.

Landing Strip

In the early 2000s, the Sukhoi Superjet-100 — then still the RRJ — won the competition because the authorities believed this aircraft would be bought by foreign airlines. And demand was indeed there. Indonesia, Thailand, Egypt, Mexico, Kazakhstan, Armenia, India, Iran, China, Ireland, Belgium, Italy — all these countries planned to purchase Sukhoi aircraft. Especially since in 2012, the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) issued a type certificate.

Mexican carrier Interjet announced the purchase of 30 Sukhoi SuperJet-100s in 2012. The company considered various options but settled on the Russian airliner — the price was lower than competitors. Then Russian Ambassador to Mexico Valery Morozov called this a «breakthrough.» Interjet presented the deal as an important strategic step in the airline«s development. But by January 2018, the fleet began to idle. In 2019, a significant portion of the Russian aircraft was sent to storage. In 2023, a court declared Interjet bankrupt.

In Latin America, Interjet was once considered one of Mexico«s leading airlines. One of the reasons for its bankruptcy was the purchase of the SSJ-100:

«Starting in 2019, Interjet faced serious financial problems. A series of unfortunate decisions, including the acquisition of Russian Sukhoi SuperJet-100 aircraft that had operational failures and maintenance issues, negatively affected its financial situation. The situation was exacerbated by debts to suppliers, the Mexican Tax Administration Service (SAT), and Mexico City International Airport (AICM), as well as unpaid employee salaries,» writes Ambito, one of Argentina«s most influential daily online publications.

Irish airline CityJet also bet on the Superjet. It purchased them in 2016–2017. But just a couple of years later, the only European operator of the Russian aircraft abandoned it. As wrote the local paper The Irish Times, the airline encountered «teething problems.» In particular, maintenance of the SSJ-100 was slow, which «affected their reliability.» CityJet switched to Bombardier CRJ900s. The Superjets were returned to Russia.

The Indonesian airline Sky Aviation received its first Sukhoi in 2012, and its third in 2014. It planned to buy 12 aircraft in total. But in that same 2014, the airline announced a suspension of operations due to financial problems, as reported by local publication Tribunnews.

And the sale of Superjets to Iran never succeeded. The aircraft consisted of more than 10% American components, which required Russia to obtain US consent for delivery. The United States turned out to be opposed to selling SSJ-100s to Iran. Although the plans were grandiose — 100 aircraft over 5 years.

«At that time, I often held working meetings with foreigners and talked on the phone; I asked: »Why aren«t you taking the Superjet?» They replied: «Well, if a co-participant in this project, who knows more about it than we do, has refused it, then we won»t buy it either,«» recounts the Honored Pilot.

In his opinion, one reason is the lack of after-sales service. Boeing and Airbus, for example, stipulate in their transaction documents that they guarantee delivery of any spare parts and failed mechanisms anywhere in the world within 24 hours.

«Pogosyan, having spent many, many billions, did not organize after-sales technical service for this aircraft. That»s where they burned out. Of course, no company will buy aircraft without such a guarantee. To this day, Western companies are absolutely indifferent to this aircraft. And they increasingly understand that they did the right thing,« believes Smirnov.

According to Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade Gennady Abramenkov, speaking in July 2026, Russian airlines currently have 150 aircraft «on the wing.» The main operator in the country — Rossiya Airlines — has 78 aircraft. Sukhois are also operated in varying numbers by RedWings, Azimuth, Yamal, IrAero, and Yakutia.

Incidentally, after the incident in Turkey in 2024, Rostransnadzor and the Federal Air Transport Agency conducted an inspection of Azimuth. They found more than 20 violations in flight safety. For instance, Azimuth concealed hard landings of the SSJ-100 with excessive G-loads, understated crew duty periods, and allowed aircraft to fly without proper maintenance. Moreover, about 12% of all airliner landings in 2024 were performed with porpoising — familiar and dangerous in the Superjet«s execution.

On its website, Azimuth indicates that its fleet consists only of SSJ-100s.

Go-Around

The Superjet received a new name. For the third time. This happened in 2023. Since then, the Sukhoi Superjet-100 became simply the Superjet-100 (SJ-100).

This time, the reason was import substitution. The SJ-100 is a fully domestic version of the Sukhoi. But there is a possibility that this aircraft will change its name a fourth time. In 2024, Sergei Chemezov said that the Superjet could turn into the «Yakovlev.»

Originally, the Sukhoi consisted of nearly 80% foreign components. But after 2022, there were no options left — they had to design their own. And the main thing the domestic engineers did was a new engine. Development of the PD-8 began long before the sanctions — in 2019. But, as usual, development, production, and certification dragged on.

In June 2023, then Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov reported: certification of the PD-8 aircraft engine was planned for the end of the year. In July 2025, Rostec announced that serial production of the engine would begin in 2025. The corporation also added that in 2026, they were prepared to produce 30 such engines. And as can be seen, this did not happen.

The fully domestic engine passed certification in early June 2026. At the end of the same month, it was put into serial production.

The engine story of the Superjets is generally interesting. All aircraft still have SaM146 engines, but since 2022, the French refused to build motors for the Russian airliner. The PD-8 was still at the «coming soon» stage. There was no choice but to extend the service life of the SaM146 so that the aircraft could continue flying. That is exactly what the Federal Air Transport Agency did in 2025. At the same time, they reported that with Franco-Russian engines, Sukhois could fly until 2028–2029.

And then what? Then re-engining. Or, as Oleg Smirnov says, «billions into nowhere.» The foreign engines will be removed from the old Sukhois and replaced with domestic ones. But this process is not simple. As our interlocutor says, the nacelle, attachment points, and the overall structure need to be redesigned. And this, in turn, will lead to airlines simply not being able to afford such an aircraft financially.

«The aircraft was »golden,« and it will become »diamond.« No company here can afford such expensive planes. Because re-engining an aircraft of this type costs more than the residual value of the aircraft itself. And since many aircraft have already expended a lot of their service life, there is generally no point in installing these engines. This is clearly a loss-making product for airlines,» explains Smirnov.

In his opinion, there is a possibility that after the engine replacement, the aircraft will be parked. Along with the new engines. The service life is exhausted — they won«t fly on them.

«Re-engining is an extremely expensive indulgence. And installing new engines on Superjets for that kind of money? It»s just billions into nowhere,« added the interlocutor.

According to preliminary estimates, which Kommersant reported citing sources in early July, re-engining will cost at least 115 billion rubles (approximately $1.15 billion at current rates). That is the price for replacing the motors on 50 aircraft. So it works out that two engines will cost 2.3 billion rubles ($23 million). While the price of the entire aircraft is 3.7 billion rubles ($37 million).

The head of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), Vadim Badekha, in turn, hastened to state that the airlines themselves would pay for the engine replacement.

«The cost of this modification is not high or such that the airline»s economy cannot withstand it. We do not plan to attract federal funds to finance the re-engining procedure itself,« he said, adding that according to UAC estimates, 50–100 Superjets will undergo re-engining.

In total, as part of import substitution, Rostec said, «about 40 imported systems and units» were replaced in the Sukhoi. What is now «domestic» in the aircraft:

SaM146 engines replaced with Russian PD-8s;

avionics: the entire flight and navigation system replaced;

landing gear;

auxiliary power unit (APU) replaced with a Russian analogue;

control systems, including fly-by-wire;

electrical power supply, air conditioning, and fire protection systems;

passenger cabin interior;

simplified fuselage.

And considering that the aircraft was essentially redesigned by nearly 80%, it is already a different Superjet. And it must pass certification anew. Indeed, it was sent for testing in June 2024. They are still testing; there is no type certificate.

Against this backdrop, Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin signed a directive. According to the documents, the delivery dates for all domestic aircraft are being pushed back. The first two SJ-100s were originally supposed to be delivered to the customer in December 2023. Now the deadline is July–August 2026.

«Building an aircraft means thousands of components. But where are they? Essentially, aircraft manufacturers are starting many things from scratch now. Factories are needed, machine tools that existed before, but all production was destroyed. Don»t say that they will make 20 aircraft a year. We need to look around and see if the industry is capable of this,« Smirnov explains the delays in aircraft production.

According to him, even if domestic aircraft manufacturers fulfill a quarter of their plans, that would already be good.

«We must give credit to our engineers, designers, and scientists: for better or worse, we have taken the first steps in import substitution,» he added.

Crossing Runways

Ideally, this should not have happened. But, as they say, these things happen. The idea was to build two new aircraft for different needs: the regional SJ-100 for short and medium routes and the mainline MC-21 for long routes.

Only, the MC-21, during active import substitution, lost its flight range: it decreased from 6,350 km to 3,830 km. The flight range of the SJ-100 is 3,530 km, states the developer. The MC-21 can carry a maximum of 211 passengers, while the SJ-100 can carry 103. The cruising speed is the same for both aircraft — Mach 0.82. That is approximately 870–890 km/h. If we add another aircraft into this equation, the Tu-214, which domestic engineers are working to revive, it becomes difficult to solve. The Tu-214«s range is 3,800 km. Maximum capacity is 210 passengers.

The question: who is the odd one out here?

* Mikhail Kasyanov was designated a foreign agent in Russia in 2023. In 2025, Rosfinmonitoring included him in the list of terrorists and extremists.